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PROMISE: THE NEGLECTED OBLIGATION IN EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF PROMISE
For many centuries, the unilateral promise held a central place in the obligational
theory of European private law. That centrality was assured by natural law theory, with
its emphasis upon the virtue of promise keeping (or ‘truth telling’, as more anciently it
had been described),1 Scripture,2 the Canon law,3 and Scholastic legal philosophy.4
Yet, by the close of the 17th century, natural law theory had reached its zenith, and the
new century brought with it a rational scepticism that was to unseat natural law theory
and topple promise from its primary position within the law of obligations. Promise
keeping was no longer thought to be an innate feature of human nature, but simply a
sentimental explanation for desired outcomes.5 The model of promise was gradually
replaced with that of the exchange, an outcome which suited the interests of a rising
commercial class.6 Promise was largely relegated to the more limited role of explain-
ing contracts (said to be formed by an exchange of conditional promises) or dealing
with exceptional cases (the promise of reward), though it held on in at least one of the
jurisdictions explored below as a discrete obligation, if not one which rivalled contract
in importance. The demise of promise seemed almost complete by the 20th century,
with the rise of reliance theories which sought to undermine the importance of acts of
the human will, of which promise was a prime example, and to replace them with the
notion of reliance as the normative basis for obligations.7
The above juridical development deprived European private law of the most
obvious explanation for the nature of many transactions. It is a fact that, while we
normally expect to receive something in exchange for what we give, there are also
many occasions on which we undertake duties without being able to compel a counter-
performance from anyone. For such transactions, the best explanation is that they
constitute a unilateral promise, such a promise being a declaration by which one party
commits itself to some future performance in favour of another, and to which
1 Aristotle equates truth-telling with promising: see Nicomachean Ethics iv, vii, 1127a–1127b.
2 There is an abundance of references to promise keeping in both the Old and New Testament,
as well as references to the related (though not equivalent) practice of oath-making. There is
frequent citation of scriptural references to promises by the Natural Law School in their writings.
3 Of primary importance are certain passages in both the Decretum (including D.23 c.6, C.22
q.2 c.14, and C.22, q.5, c.12) and the Decretals (including Sext 2.2.3, Sext 2.11.2, and Gregor IX,
1.35.1, 1.35.3) enjoining adherence to promises and founding ecclesiastical jurisdiction in
promissory cases.
4 See especially the writings of the late Scholastics Leonard Lessius, Luis de Molina, Thomas
Cajetan, and Franciscus Connanus.
5 See D Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Printed for John Noon, London 1739–1740)
III,ii,5.
6 The replacement of promise by contract as the central obligation can probably be traced to
the scheme of Samuel Pufendorf, of the Northern Natural Law School: see the treatment of both
contract and promise in his Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis (at I,xii) and his more
famous De Iure Naturae et Gentium (III,iv f).
7 See PS Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981), passim, and
Essays on Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986) especially ch 2.
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commitment it binds itself as a result of that declaration alone. All legal systems wish
to recognize, in some types of circumstance, the efﬁcacy of such unilateral promises,
but they often do so by forcing promise to wear the borrowed clothing of contract. This
not only distorts a proper understanding of contracts, but it displays a lack of honesty
about why liability is being imposed, for the reality is that it is being imposed because
the promisor has unilaterally bound himself by his declaration of will to undertake a
speciﬁc performance. Nothing else is needed by way of explanation, and attempts
to explain liability by reference to ﬁctional acceptances of such promises, or by an
assertion that it is detrimental reliance which is being protected, are an unhelpful
and misleading addition. That at least is the thesis advanced here, though it is freely
admitted that adoption of such a thesis would cause most European legal systems some
degree of realignment, especially those with a requirement of mutual consideration for
contracts.
In advancing this thesis, it is proposed to look at three European legal systems, and
to consider to what extent they recognize the unilateral promise and give effect to it
explicitly, rather than as a supposed or ﬁctional contract. One system has been chosen
from each of the civilian, Common Law, and mixed legal system families, namely
Germany, England, and Scotland. A brief general survey of the attitude of each to
unilateral promise is offered, followed by an analysis of how each system deals with
six different types of transaction which it is possible to class as promissory in nature,
those being ﬁrm offers, options, pre-contractual undertakings concerning the con-
tractual bidding process, promises of reward, renunciations of contractual rights, and
donation. Reference will also be made at various points to the Draft Common Frame of
Reference and how it treats some of these types of transaction.
As a ﬁnal preliminary remark, something more must be said on the terminology to
be adopted in the analysis that follows. A unilateral promise has already been deﬁned
above. What makes such a promise unilateral is that it is constituted by the act or
declaration of will of one party alone, this making it a type of unilateral juridical act (or
unilateral legal transaction). This contrasts promise with contract, where the acts of
will of at least two parties are required to constitute the contract, this making all
contracts bilateral juridical acts or transactions. A unilateral promise is also necessarily
unilateral in the further sense that it imposes duties on only one party, the promisor.
Another way of expressing this feature of unilateral promise is to describe it as
gratuitous: the promisor is undertaking to perform his duty without any reciprocal duty
being imposed on the promisee. A contract, by contrast, may (in those systems which
do not require mutual consideration) impose a duty (or duties) on only one party, or on
both. In this sense, contracts may be styled unilateral or bilateral, or preferably gratu-
itous or onerous (in order to avoid confusion with the use of the terms unilateral and
bilateral to describe the number of parties required to constitute the act). Thus, a
contract which obliges only one party to perform something in favour of the other is a
bilateral juridical act, but a gratuitous (or unilateral) contract.8 As will be seen in the
8 The distinction between unilaterality and bilaterality, both as describing the nature of the
juridical act as well as the number of parties upon whom duties are imposed, is widely recognised
in civilian systems, as well as in mixed systems such as South Africa and Louisiana. See, for
instance, the Louisiana Civil Code, which has provisions relating to juridical acts (art 28) as well
as to deﬁning types of contract, including unilateral contracts (art 1907), bilateral contracts (art
1908), onerous contracts (art 1909) and gratuitous contracts (art 1910).
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following discussion, some systems which do not generally recognize the validity of a
unilateral promise nonetheless conceive of a role for unilateral juridical acts other than
obligation creating ones as a way of effecting certain transactions having a unilateral
nature.
II. THE GENERAL APPROACH OF GERMAN, ENGLISH AND SCOTS LAW TO PROMISE
With the wider European legal history in mind, and with deﬁnitional matters dealt
with, a general survey of how the three legal systems in question treat promise will be
useful.
In German law, contract is the way by which parties may voluntarily enter in to an
obligational relationship (‘ein vertragliches Schuldverha¨ltnis’), as opposed to being
placed under such a relationship by virtue of the law (as is the case with the obligations
of delict, unjustiﬁed enrichment, and negotiorum gestio). A contract is formed by the
declarations of will (‘Willenserkla¨rungen’) of two or more persons: without such
declarations of the parties a contract cannot be constituted as a valid legal transaction.
That is not to say that a contractual relationship can never be affected by a unilateral
legal transaction, for it may: rescission of contract for mistake, or termination of a sale
of goods contract for non-conformity of the goods, for instance, are both valid juridical
acts constituted by the act of will of only one party. But that type of unilateral juridical
act cannot create a contractual relationship to begin with.
It will be obvious that in such a scheme there is little evident room for the unilateral
promise. Yet German law very nearly took a different course when the German Civil
Code (BGB) was promulgated in 1900, as one of the leading drafters of the contract
provisions of the Code, Franz von Ku¨bel, wanted unilateral promise to be generally
recognized in the Code. Von Ku¨bel’s opinion did not prevail, however, and during the
drafting of the BGB unilateral promise was relegated to an exceptional explanation for
certain unusual types of act which could not be explained in any other way. The
clearest example is the public promise of reward, which, as is explained more fully
below, is classiﬁed in ·657 BGB as a type of unilateral promise. The opportunity was,
however, lost for a greater role for promise in German obligations theory. Despite this
lost opportunity, as will be seen below, because offers are in general irrevocable in
German law and there is no requirement of mutual consideration, German law is able
to give binding contractual effect to some undertakings which the Common law
struggles to explain or cannot do so. For that reason, German Law may be placed
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of respect for, and honesty regarding,
promissory liability.
English law has the greatest difﬁculty of the three systems studied in recognizing
unilateral promises. The doctrine of mutual consideration means that both a unilateral
promise and a gratuitous contract are prima facie invalid in English law. This difﬁculty
can be elided if a party commits a unilateral declaration to beneﬁt another to deed form,
thereby giving the declaration legal force, but this is a somewhat cumbersome method
and not one easily applicable (if at all) to some of the potentially promissory circum-
stances discussed below. An increasing willingness to ﬁnd consideration demonstrated
in esoteric and ﬁctional ways, a judicial willingness in some cases simply to overlook
the requirement of consideration, and use of the artiﬁcial device of the ‘unilateral
contract’ (a species of unilateral promise by another name), further alleviate the
problem posed by the consideration rule. English law is nonetheless compelled to treat
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all voluntary obligational transactions as contracts, no matter how unilateral their
nature, even the promise of reward. The result is an awkward forcing of unilateral
undertakings into ill-ﬁtting contractual clothing. Overall, the attitude of English law to
unilateral promises may fairly be described as placing it at the hostile end of the
promissory spectrum, a somewhat lamentable characterisation for a system whose
contract law developed partly out of the promissory action of assumpsit.9
Scots law is the odd man out in the European legal tradition. Alone of European
systems, it recognizes unilateral promise as a separate species of voluntary obligation,
not merely as some sort of unusual, modiﬁed contractual liability. Scottish legal
development was heavily inﬂuenced by the canon law’s enforcement of promises, as
the Scottish civil courts took over ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the church courts in
the 16th century, thereby absorbing the rule on enforcement of unilateral promises into
the civil law.10 Though there is a requirement of subscribed written documents for non-
commercial promises, promises undertaken in the course of business are binding
without any speciﬁc legal form.11 As will be seen below, the recognition of genuine
unilateral promissory liability makes it much easier for Scots law to clothe certain
transactions in a legal form which most closely mirrors their nature as unilateral
undertakings. For this reason, Scots lawmust be placed at the end of the spectrum giving
the greatest respect to promissory liability. It is suggested that its solutions to some of
the circumstances analysed below bear some consideration by other jurisdictions as a
possible model for future development of the law.
Having sketched the general approach to unilateral promises of the three systems, it
is proposed to consider six speciﬁc instances of transactions having a unilateral
character to see how the three systems cope with explaining liability in each case.
III. SPECIFIC FACT SITUATIONS WITH A POTENTIALLY UNILATERAL PROMISSORY ANALYSIS
A. The Firm Offer
By a ﬁrm offer is meant one which the offeror has bound himself to keep open for a
speciﬁed period of time. Consider the following example:
A offers to provide B with certain services at a certain price. A states clearly that ‘my offer
is open for acceptance until 5pm on Friday.’ B goes away and, on the basis of A’s offer,
submits an offer of his own to C in which B offers to provide certain services to C (which
will incorporate some of A’s work). B’s offer is accepted by C on Thursday afternoon.
Knowing that the contract with C is secure, B is about to accept A’s offer when A with-
draws it. Quid juris?
In such a case, German law would create in effect, if not explicitly in name, a
unilateral obligation to keep the offer open: the offer, though it remains a proposal of
terms and does not give rise to a contract unless accepted, cannot be withdrawn during
the period for which A stated it would remain open.12 The effect produced by the
9 For the history of rise of the action of assumpsit, including its transformation from prom-
issory to contractual nature, see D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations
(OUP, Oxford 2001) ch 7.
10 See further W D H Sellar, ‘Promise’ in K Reid & R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private
Law in Scotland (OUP, Oxford 2000) vol 2, ch 10.
11 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s1(2)(a)(ii).
12 See ·145 BGB, together with ·148 (concerning time limits).
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default position in Germany, out of which an offeror can opt, is the same as the effect
produced by the optional position in Scotland. Unlike Scots law, however, the German
law does not explicitly employ the language of a unilateral promise to achieve this
effect, ·145 BGB simply stating that the offer ‘binds’ the offeror (the offeror is ‘an den
Antrag gebunden’) without telling us what the nature of the binding is (clearly it cannot
be a contractual binding, as there is no contract yet). That it ought to be seen as a
genuine unilateral binding effect is supported by what von Ku¨bel intended to be the
position for offers in the BGB: he headed his submission to the ﬁrst drafting
Commission of the BGB on the topic of contractual offers with the words ‘The uni-
lateral promise as grounding the obligation to keep one’s word (contractual offer)’.13
His proposal that offers be generally binding was accepted, giving rise to ·145.
English law resolutely refuses to give effect to the stated wish of A and any ex-
pectations of B, a position which is troubling both for those who adhere to will based
theories of contract law as well as for those who support reliance based theories. Unless
A has received something for his undertaking to keep his offer open, he is not bound to
it. Thus the perennial problem of consideration raises its head, a doctrine which refuses
to concede that a party might conceivably demonstrate seriousness of intent without
receiving something in exchange for its promise. The result in the case of the ﬁrm offer
is clearly absurd, and to its credit US Common Law has developed to apply the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel to at least give B a right to damages in the circumstances
of the stated example.14
In Scotland, as in England, offers are in general revocable until accepted. But in
Scotland an offeror can opt to make the offer binding for a stated time simply by
specifying, as in the example, a clear time limit for acceptance. By so doing A is treated
as having made a binding unilateral promise that it will not revoke the offer until the
stated time. B, as the recipient of such a promise by A to keep the offer open, can
enforce this promise by accepting the offer within the time limit, A’s withdrawal of the
offer therefore being ineffective. Scots law thus gives effect to the clearly stated in-
tention of the offeror to bind himself unilaterally, doing so not by changing the default
nature of the offer from a mere proposal of terms, incapable itself of giving rise to any
obligations, to something itself binding, but by attaching to the offer an additional
obligation constituted by the unilateral promise. This has the desired effect of making
the offer binding, though those from outside the Scottish legal system might ﬁnd the
analysis of a separate promise to keep the offer open a somewhat convoluted approach.
In assessing the relative attractiveness of these different approaches, it is suggested
that either the Scots or the German position is preferable to that of the Common Law.
Other than the reason of a continued, unquestioning loyalty to the requirement of
consideration, there seems no good reason not to hold a party to an undertaking that it
binds itself to keep an offer open for a stated period. As for model contract law, the
approach of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) in relation to the example
13 This is my own translation of von Ku¨bel’s original German text, which reads: ‘Das einsei-
tige Versprechen als Grund der Verpﬂichtung zum Worthalten (Vertragsantrag)’ (von Ku¨bel, in
Werner Schubert (ed), Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren fu¨r die erste Kommission zur Ausarbeitung
des Entwurfs eines Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, Recht der Schuldverha¨ltnisse, (De Gruyter, Berlin
1980) vol 3, s 1145 f).
14 See the decision of the California Supreme Court in Drennan v Star Paving Company 333 P
2d 757 (Cal 1958).
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given above seems to come closest to the Scots approach: the default rule in the DCFR
is that an offer is revocable until acceptance is despatched,15 but a revocation is
ineffective if the offer ﬁxes a stated time for its acceptance.16 However, like the
German law, the DCFR does not explicitly use the term ‘promise’ or ‘unilateral
promise’. The language used avoids describing directly the nature of the obligation the
offeror is under, by instead talking of the revocation being ‘ineffective’ rather than
describing the offer as being binding. The provisions of the DCFR, while thus not
explicitly promissory in nature, do achieve a unilateral binding effect.
B. Options
There is no single way to deﬁne the concept of an option. To make the term mean-
ingful, however, it must be taken to signify more than just the right of someone who is
in receipt of a revocable offer to accept it, otherwise option would mean no more than
offer17 and vice versa. One could call a ﬁrm offer an option, because such an offer
gives the offeree an identiﬁable right, rather than just the liberty, to accept the offer. On
such a view, in German law all offers would, by default, be classed as options, because
they give the offeree a right to accept the offer enforceable against the offeror if
the offeror tries to revoke the offer18 (though, in fact, German law does not call an
irrevocable offer an option). For present comparative purposes, a fairly inclusive view
will be taken of the concept of an option, it being understood as:
a right granted by A, either by way of ﬁrm offer, contract, or unilateral promise (but not by
revocable offer) which confers upon B a power either to compel A to enter into a further
contract with B or else to confer some other beneﬁt upon B.
Under this deﬁnition, an option could be the result of a bilateral juridical act (if arising
as the result of the declarations of intent of two parties) or a unilateral juridical act (if
arising only as the result of one party’s declaration of intent).
With the above deﬁnition in mind, the following example may be considered:
A grants an option to B, for no consideration, allowing B to purchase some land in A’s
ownership, such option to be exercisable within one year of its grant. When B exercises the
option nine months later, A reneges on the option. Quid juris?
How would the three systems we are looking at deal with this situation? German Law
recognizes the validity of an option contract (Optionsvertrag), this being a contract in
terms of which one party is given the right to require the other party to enter into a
further contract with him, though no speciﬁc provision is made for such a contract in
the BGB. Though the contract thus creates circumstances which may be unilateral in
nature (in the sense that it may confer rights only on one party), the option may only be
obtained by the usual contractual methods and not through any unilateral juridical act.
If the option concerned the sale of land, it would have to comply with the provisions of
·311b on land contracts and would thus require notarial authentication.
In English Law, as with the ﬁrm offer example, the principal hurdle here is the
doctrine of consideration. A valid option can only arise in English law if it is given for
some reciprocal consideration. Nonetheless, given the willingness of the courts to ﬁnd
15 II-4:202(1). 16 II-4:202(3)(b).
17 At least offer as conceived generally in English and Scots Law.
18 ·145 BGB.
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ever more imaginary instances of consideration, a potential purchaser of land under
an option might very well be seen as having provided consideration for the option by,
for instance, instructing a survey to assess the suitability of the land for an intended
purpose. In the absence of some type of consideration however, no matter how strained
or convoluted it may be, a gratis option (such as that in the example) is clearly invalid.
Where options are validly created in English law, they are conceived of a species of
so-called ‘unilateral contract’, as they create binding duties on only one party. As
unilateral contracts they are said to transform into bilateral or synallagmatic contracts
once the option is exercised.19 So English law, in trying to describe a unilateral obli-
gation, has to give it the clothing of contract in order for it to be accommodated within
the Common Law obligational model.
In Scots Law, the nature of an option can be that of a ﬁrm offer (which, as noted
above, is an offer with a promise attached to it to keep the offer open) requiring
acceptance,20 or simply a promise, plain and simple, not requiring any acceptance
(though still evidently requiring to be exercised by some sort of notiﬁcation). Scots
Law thus has no difﬁculty with saying that an option can be constituted by a unilateral
promise, indeed the reported cases seem to indicate a preference for such a promissory
view. If the option relates to a real right in land, it would have to be in subscribed
writing,21 but where the option is in promissory rather than contractual form, only the
promise itself is required to be in signed writing and not the exercise of the option.22
What can be said of the approach of the three systems? It of course seems right to
allow parties to constitute an option in contractual form if that is what they wish. But
what objection can there be to allowing a party, if it wishes, to grant an option by way
of unilateral promise? Especially where the option is gratuitous in nature, unilateral
promise seems an idea vehicle for its constitution. Naturally, if the party in whose
favour the option is conceived does not wish to take the beneﬁt of it, it is a simple
enough act for it to reject it, much as a donee can reject under a donation.
The DCFR has no provision speciﬁcally dealing with options.23 The assumption
seems to be that they will be treated like any other type of contract, as in German law.
However, the DCFR’s general provision on unilateral undertakings24 seems equally
capable of application to an option, so that there would appear, as in Scots law, to be
two possible conceptualisations of an option under the DCFR, either contractual or
promissory.
C. Pre-contractual Undertakings Concerning the Contractual Bidding Process
It is not uncommon for a party inviting bids for a contract to state how it will conduct
the bidding process and how it will handle any bids received. If bidders discover that
19 See Lord Diplock in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444 (HL),
477A-B.
20 For a case of an option conceived of as a ﬁrm offer see Hamilton v Lochrane (1899) 1 F 478
(CSIH).
21 Requirements of Writing Act (Scotland) 1995, s 1(2)(a)(i).
22 Stone v Macdonald 1979 SC 363 (CSOH).
23 Though there is passing reference in IX.-1.103 to the option of a lessee to buy leased goods
at the expiry of the lease, though without indicating how the nature of such an option is conceived.
24 II-1:103(2): ‘A valid unilateral undertaking is binding on the person giving it if it is intended
to be legally binding without acceptance.’
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such conditions have been broken, what recourse, if any, do they have in contract law
against the party who invited the bids?
Consider this example:
A invites bids for 10,000 shares which it holds in a company. A says that (1) it will
not consider bids submitted after midnight on 1 February, and (2) that it will accept
the highest bid submitted before that deadline so long as it is at least £100,000. B and C
submit bids before the time limit of £105,000 and £110,00 respectively. D submits a late
bid of £112,000. A accepts D’s bid. C believes the shares should be transferred to it. Quid
juris?
In this example, the German courts would be likely to hold the party inviting the
bids to the highest timely offer (that submitted by C). That result would seem to agree
with the approach of the Budesgerichthof (BGH) in a judgment from 2002 concerning
an online car auction, in which the court held the seller to a commitment that it would
sell to the highest bidder.25 Unlike the court below it, the BGH expressed some doubt
as to which party had made the offer and which the acceptance (given that the seller’s
‘acceptance’, if acceptance it were, had been made before the ‘offer’ of the buyer), but
it took the view that that matter didn’t require a speciﬁc ruling, given that the concepts
of offer and acceptance were merely two manifestations of the more fundamental idea
of a Willenserkla¨rung (declaration of will) and that it was clear that both parties had
made such a declaration of will binding themselves to a contract of sale to the highest
bidder.26
In English law, the prima facie problem for a case such as this is that C would seem
to have no claim given that it does not appear to have a contract with A. However,
English law, recognizing the inequitable nature of not enforcing undertakings made at
the pre-contractual stage, has fashioned a solution to this problem. In a case somewhat
similar to the example given, Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada,27
an invalid bid was struck out by their Lordships and the next highest bidder held
entitled to the property concerned (a parcel of shares).28 The reasoning of the House of
Lords was that, when the seller indicated to the bidders that it would accept the highest
bid for the shares, it was in fact making an offer to sell the shares (even if not described
as an offer), an offer capable of acceptance only by one party (the highest bidder),
so that when that party made its bid it was in fact accepting the offer and concluding
the contract of sale.29 In Harvela, such an offer was described by Lord Diplock as
a ‘unilateral contract’ because it bound the party issuing it, the instant it was issued,
to accept the highest bid.30 That unilateral contract was said to transform into
25 NJW 2002, 363.
26 In fact, in a similar case from 2005, the BGH expressed the view that the seller had made the
offer, and the buyer the acceptance when it submitted the highest bid: BGH JZ 2005, 464; NJW
2005, 53. 27 [1986] AC 207 (HL).
28 The facts of Harvela were not quite the same as the example, as in Harvela what invalidated
the seemingly higher bid was not its late submission but the fact that it was a referential bid,
something which the House of Lords held was not permitted under the bidding process envisaged
by the seller.
29 This is an unusual analysis of a contract bidding process, as usually those bidding for a
contract are seen as making offers, with the party inviting the bids then accepting (or not) one of
them. But in such a normal case, the party inviting bids has the discretion which, if any, to choose
to accept, a discretion which had been excluded in Harvela.
30 See the speech of Lord Diplock [1986] AC 207, 224.
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a bilateral or synallagmatic contract when the highest bidder submitted its bid.31 It is
clearly an odd kind of contract which can be formed merely by the declaration of will
of one party alone, and without any clear consideration having been given for the
promise (unless perhaps the time and effort expended in putting the bid together).
These oddities provide the clue for concluding that what in reality the House of Lords
was doing was giving effect to a unilateral promise, albeit under the guise of contrac-
tual liability. The solution is not an elegant one, but it at least represents an imaginative
and equitable way of holding a party to its clearly expressed undertakings about how it
will conduct a bidding process.
In Scotland, it is unlikely that, on the facts of the example given, A’s undertaking
would be described as giving rise to a ‘unilateral contract’, given the existence in Scots
law of an obligation of unilateral promise tailor-made to enforce unilateral under-
takings. A’s stated conditions about the bidding process would each be seen as a
unilateral promise made by A to each of the bidders. A’s promise not to accept late bids
would invalidate D’s late bid; A would therefore be in breach of its promise to C to
accept its bid, given that it submitted the highest valid bid. C would be able to enforce
this promise judicially by asking a court to declare C to have contracted validly for the
purchase of the shares and to order the transfer of the shares to it.
Which jurisdictional approach is best here? Should a party setting out bidding
conditions be viewed as making promises, making a unilateral contract, manifesting a
declaration of will to contract with one identiﬁed person, or as doing something else?
Any preferred analysis ought to be able to deal with even more conceptually difﬁcult
cases than the example given above. Just such a more conceptually difﬁcult case would
be one where the party inviting bids did not bind itself to accept any particular bid.
What, for instance, if the only condition stipulated by the party inviting bids was that
all bids submitted on time would be considered, but not that any particular bid would
be accepted, and one of the unsuccessful bidders wanted to complain about a breach of
that condition, on the grounds that (it alleges) its timely bid was improperly rejected?
The German approach of the BGH in the online auction case will not solve this prob-
lem, as it is in no way clear that the party inviting bids would have manifested the will
to contract with the unhappy bidder even if its bid had been considered. At best, all the
unhappy bidder is claiming is that it lost the chance of being awarded the contract, a
lost chance which perhaps merits an award of damages. German law might utilize the
concept of culpa in contrahendo to provide a solution here, given that the party inviting
bids could be said to have culpably injured the interests of the bidder during the
contract formation process.32 English law would still maintain that the unhappy bidder
had a contractual right to have its timely bid considered, as the Court of Appeal did in
its decision in Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council.33 Though
the term ‘unilateral contract’ was not used in the judgment in that case, it is clear
that the Court of Appeal saw a subsidiary contract governing the bidding process as
existing, a contract ancillary to the main contract intended to be concluded with the
31 The analysis of transformation from unilateral to bilateral contract is identical to that said to
apply in options contracts, the judge providing this analysis in Harvela being the same Lord
Diplock who gave judgment in the options case of Sudbrook Trading (n 19).
32 The previously uncodiﬁed doctrine of culpa in contrahendo now ﬁnds a place in the BGB, in
·311(2).
33 [1990] 1 WLR 1195 (CA), [1990] 3 All ER 25.
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successful bidder. Again therefore, the English court used the vehicle of contract to
solve the problem of the breach of an obligation having an essentially unilateral
promissory nature. Scots law, in this trickier type of case, would be likely to continue
to adopt a unilateral promissory analysis, so long as breach of a clearly identiﬁed
promise of the party inviting bids could be said to be the source of the alleged loss of a
chance.34
Breaches of conditions laid down by a party inviting contractual bids seem, in cases
where breach of the condition cannot be remedied by awarding the contract to the
victim of the breach, to be a clear candidate for a unilateral promissory solution. The
undertakings given are unilaterally adopted by the party in question, for no consider-
ation, and may give rise to grievances by bidders who do not end up being awarded the
contract in question. To adopt a unilateral contract analysis, as English law does, is a
makeshift solution, which again presses contract into service to deal with promissory
problems. Culpa in contrahendo provides another possible solution, though the desir-
ability of the development of a distinct ﬁeld of pre-contractual liability is beyond the
scope of the present investigation.
D. Promises of Reward
A promise of reward is a paradigm case of a unilateral promise. The party promising
the reward is, from the moment its intention to do so is communicated (whether to one
party or to the public at large), binding itself to pay the reward. As the declaration
of will of no other party is needed to bring the promisor’s duty into being, this is the
very essence of a unilateral juridical act. Moreover, because the promise imposes no
reciprocal duties upon the promisee(s), but merely a discretion to fulﬁl the condition of
the reward, the obligation is also strictly gratuitous (even if the promisor has stipulated
conduct for the condition of the reward which the promisor hopes will bring some
beneﬁt to the promisor if and when it is performed). The conceptual beneﬁt of seeing
such promises of reward as unilateral promises is that the obligation is properly
recognized as coming into being immediately the promisor’s intention to be bound is
objectively communicated (rather than when accepted in some way) and that it can be
enforced by a promisee even if he was unaware of the reward when he performed the
stipulated conduct.
In German law, the treatment of a private offer of reward (one made to a speciﬁc
party or parties) is somewhat awkward. It is not seen as a genuine unilateral promise,
but might conceivably be treated as giving rise to a service contract, work contract, or
contract to transact business, if accepted, each of these classiﬁcations being governed
by separate provisions of the BGB.35 This marks an awkward contrast with the reward
34 In the Blackpool case the undertaking which the defendant had breached was in fact an
implied undertaking, rather than an express one, a feature which might have caused difﬁculties for
the Scots promissory analysis, given that it has traditionally been the position in Scots law that
promises are construed strictly. It would thus be unusual in Scotland to imply a promise of one
nature from an express promise of a different nature made by the promisor.
35 For service contracts see ··611–630, for work contracts ··631–651, and for contracts to
transact business ·675. For a recent judgment demonstrating that an offer of reward to a speciﬁc
person is also unlikely to be viewed as a donation, but rather as consideration for the offeree’s
efforts in trying to bring about the desired state of affairs, see BGH judgment of 28 May 2009—
Xa ZR 9/08 (LG Potsdam).
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offered to the public (Auslobung), which more sensibly and naturally is treated (under
·657) as a species of enforceable unilateral promise. The only requirement is that the
reward be made known by ‘public announcement’; no particular form, such as writing,
is speciﬁed. By contrast with the default rule in German law for offers in general,36
·658 provides that, unless stated to be irrevocable, a promise of reward may be revoked
until the act which is the condition for the reward is undertaken (this avoids the
problem in the Common Law of the revoked reward). It is speciﬁcally provided in ·657
that it does not matter if the promisee knew of the existence of the reward when
he carried out the conduct which is the subject of the reward (which again marks a
contrast with the Common Law view).
In English Law, a promise of reward must necessarily be treated as an offer, whether
one made to a particular individual or to the public at large, though the need for
communication of an acceptance in cases of offers to the public is considered to be
waived.37 As any resulting obligation will place an enforceable duty on the promisor
alone, such offers of reward have been said to give rise to unilateral contracts in
English law. The offeree comes under no duty, but has the choice, if he so wishes, of
consciously performing the stipulated conduct in the knowledge that he is doing so in
fulﬁlment of the terms of the offer of reward. This, however, means that (unlike in
German and Scots law) someone who performs the conduct in ignorance of the reward
cannot subsequently claim the reward.38 The adoption of an offer analysis also means
that, as is generally the case under English law, the offer can be revoked at any time
until it is accepted by the offeree. This creates potential problems for English law: what
is the position where an offeror, seeing a member of the public walking towards his
house with the offeror’s lost dog, shouts out the window ‘I revoke my offer of reward’?
The answer which has been suggested is that the offeree who begins to perform the
conduct stipulated has validly accepted the offer.39 This is a sensible practical solution,
but the problem would be avoided by adoption of a genuinely promissory analysis.
Scots law is able to view promise of reward as an ordinary example of a unilateral
promise, and not as an exceptional undertaking (as in German law). A promise of
reward, whether made to the public or a speciﬁc person, can be characterized as a
unilateral promise, and enforced as such. Furthermore, according to promissory doc-
trine in Scotland, a promise once made cannot be revoked (unless power to do so has
been retained), so that the difﬁculties of a promisor who subsequently tries to avoid
paying a reward by revoking it are avoided. On the other hand, one practical problem
with a promissory approach to cases of reward is that, unless the reward is offered in
the course of business, it has to be in subscribed written form in order to be validly
constituted.40 That would be unusual for an offer of reward, many of which appear
36 Which, according to ·145, cannot be revoked unless power to do so has been reserved by the
offeror.
37 Carlill v Carbolic Small Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 (CA).
38 There is no English case clearly setting out this view, though it would seem to follow from
the general principles applicable to acceptances. For an Australian case adopting this view, see R
v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227 (High Court of Australia); to similar effect, see the South African
case of Bloom v American Swiss Watch Co (1915) AD 100 (Appellate Division).
39 No decision of the courts deﬁnitively sets out this view, though the comments of Denning LJ
in Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA), 295, support it. For a discussion of the issues, see
E Peel, The Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 41–43.
40 See Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s1(2)(a)(ii).
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simply on photocopied notices of reward, or as advertisements in newspapers or in
shop windows. This problem can be avoided if recourse is had to the English approach,
and in fact, under English inﬂuence, some Scottish courts have taken just such an
approach, describing offers of reward made to the public as contractual offers capable
of acceptance by conduct.41
E. Renunciations of Contractual Rights
The renunciation of contractual rights (as well as the transaction considered next,
donation) has the added complication that, apart from being potentially classiﬁable as
either a contract or a unilateral promise, it may be given a further possible classiﬁcation
of a unilateral juridical act other than an obligation creating one. This further classiﬁ-
cation is taken into account in the following discussion. A further difﬁculty in this ﬁeld
is the variety of English language terms encountered: a renunciation of rights can also
be called waiver, release, discharge, remission, acceptilation,42 a pactum de non pe-
tendo, or simply and more generically an alteration of contract. Because some of these
other terms have speciﬁc meanings and technicalities in certain legal systems, the more
neutral term renunciation will be used here. What is meant by this term, for the pur-
poses of the present discussion, is an express declaration by one contracting party that
he is releasing the other from a duty or duties imposed on him by the contract. There is
of course the further issue of the characterisation of implied renunciations of rights, but
constraints of space prevent consideration of that issue here.43
As a renunciation is conceptually a giving up or abandonment of only one party’s
contractual rights, it is easy to see how it might be given a unilateral, rather than
bilateral, characterization. Why should my decision to lay down my rights against you
need your consent, permission, or other involvement? It is, after all, an action which
would seem to be of inherent beneﬁt to you.44 As such, there seems no objection to
such an act being seen either as a unilateral promise (a promise not to enforce the rights
in question) or simply as a unilateral juridical act by which the creditor declares that
the rights in his favour are immediately renounced (which act would not be promiss-
ory, given that it would not bind the creditor to any future performance, but rather a
unilateral act by which rights were presently terminated by the right-holder). The
alternative view is to see a renunciation as a contractual offer, one which therefore
requires an acceptance by the offeree before the renunciation takes effect. Where that
alternative view is favoured this is often said to be because, as contractual rights come
41 Hunter v General Accident Corp 1909 SC 344 (CSIH), affd 1909 SC (HL Sc) 30; Hunter v
Hunter (1904) 7 F 136 (CSIH).
42 The term is encountered in Scots law, and derives etymologically from Roman law’s
acceptilatio, which was an oral form of the dissolution of an orally constituted obligation.
43 The topic of implied renunciation brings in issues of promissory estoppel or personal bar
which are not the main focus of the present discussion, though promissory estoppel will be
mentioned in passing in the discussion of English law.
44 It has been argued that it is possible to conceive of rare cases where release of a debtor from
an obligation may make the debtor worse off overall, so that he will wish to be able to refuse the
‘beneﬁt’ of such a release, though it is hard to imagine what the facts of such cases might be. More
conceivably, a debtor may have a moral reason for not wishing to be released from his debts, that
being that he holds it consistent with honesty and good faith that he discharges in full all duties he
has contracted.
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into being by the consent of two or more parties, it is symmetrical to see their extinc-
tion as also, in general, requiring consent.45
In German law, ·397 of the BGB sets out the general rule on renunciation of rights
deriving from obligations (including from contracts).46 The heading of this section is
somewhat unhelpfully translated in the ofﬁcial Federal Ministry of Justice English
version of the BGB as ‘forgiveness’, but what is meant is the extinction of debts. ·397
provides that an obligation is extinguished if, by contractual agreement of the parties,
the creditor either releases the debtor or acknowledges that the debt does not exist. The
two methods speciﬁed thus cover both the express release of a debtor and the release
which is to be implied from the creditor’s statement that he no longer considers the
debtor to be under the obligation. Both methods have the effect of terminating the
obligation in question, not simply of suspending the duty of performance temporarily,
though there is no reason why contracting parties might not alternatively provide for
such a temporary suspension by contractual agreement.
The wording of ·397 appears, on the face of it, to be quite unequivocal as to the need
for a contractual agreement. It has however recently been argued by one German
academic, Kleinschmidt, that the apparent wording of the provision may not be as
prescriptive as it ﬁrst appears, and that in practice the courts assume acceptance
or simply ignore the need for such.47 Kleinschmidt argues that ·397 is permissive
rather than prescriptive: it allows for contractual renunciation, which has the effect of
terminating the obligation, but does not forbid a unilateral renunciation. He further
argues that, though ·311(1) is rightly considered as establishing a general principle
requiring a contractual route for the voluntary creation and variation of obligations, if
the purpose of that provision is considered (it being designed to encapsulate freedom
of contract), then it is consistent with that purpose to recognize unilateral renunciations
if that is the form which the renouncing party wishes to give the renunciation. In
support of this argument, Kleinschmidt points out that, under ·423, an agreement
between a creditor and one of a number of joint debtors can have the effect of ex-
tinguishing the whole debt, the renunciation of the debt taking effect against the other
debtors unilaterally, even in the absence of their consent. If renunciation of contractual
debts can effectively occur unilaterally so far as co-debtors are concerned, there would
appear to be no theoretical objection to such renunciations operating in favour of a sole
debtor.
Though Kleinschmidt’s position that unilateral renunciations are presently per-
missible under the existing provisions of the BGB is not the generally accepted view
45 There must necessarily be exceptions to any policy favouring such contractual symmetry:
termination for breach, for instance, is clearly an asymmetric juridical act (though even here one
might assert of a sort of symmetry by virtue of the presence of the other party’s wrongful act of
breach).
46 There are some further more speciﬁc provisions on renunciation elsewhere in the BGB, such
as ·533 concerning waiver of the right to revoke a donation, ·658 on waiver of the right to revoke
a public offer of reward, and various provisions on the waiver of inheritance rights.
47 See J Kleinschmidt, Der Verzicht im Schuldrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tu¨bingen, 2004).
Kleinschmidt’s argument has generated support from the following (among others): R
Zimmermann, AcP 202 (2002), 243, 270; G Schulze, in Antwaltkommentar zum BGB (Deutscher
Anwaltverlag, Bonn 2005) vol 1, ··145–147, fn 15; Hans Stoll, ZEuP 2007, 396, 398; E A
Kramer, in Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch (5th edn, Beck Juristischer
Verlag, Munich 2006) vol 2, Einleitung fn 55.
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of ·397,48 the view that it should be the formal position has been advocated by
other commentators since the 19th century. If German courts are in effect permitting
such unilateral renunciations, it would surely be more honest for the legal system to
recognize them for what they are and to cease to force essentially unilateral acts into a
bilateral contractual model.
English Law faces the problem with renunciation of rights that, since the 16th
century onwards, the courts have taken the view that informal agreements to vary a
contract are not valid, including variations in terms of which a creditor undertakes to
renounce some or all of its rights.49 The position adopted was a consequence of the
doctrine of consideration: some consideration requires to have been received by the
party undertaking the renunciation in order to make the act valid.50 This view was
upheld by 18th and 19th century courts, with the development that the courts were
willing to treat even a slight beneﬁt in the creditor’s favour as valid consideration.
Despite this development, the courts maintained the view that the alleged ‘practical
beneﬁt’ of a creditor receiving the part performance of a debt, rather than the alterna-
tive possibility of no performance at all from a ﬁnancially distressed debtor, did not
count as valid consideration for a renunciation of the debt.51 The harsh results stem-
ming from the requirement of mutual consideration for a valid renunciation of rights
has been somewhat mitigated by the development of the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel, a promissory based defence which fulﬁls some of the functions that would be
met by a properly recognized obligation of unilateral promise, but only where reliance
has been placed on the promise.
In Scotland, which recognizes the validity of both contract and unilateral promise, it
is in consequence possible to clothe a renunciation in either contractual or promissory
form. A creditor can offer, either for some consideration or gratuitously, to release a
debtor from a debt, and the acceptance of such an offer creates a binding contract (or
contractual variation, depending on the intent) to that effect. Alternatively, a creditor
can promise unilaterally that it will not enforce contractual rights for the future (a
promise which might conceivably be interpreted not as wholly extinguishing the rights
but as meaning that the promisor is merely binding himself not to enforce rights which
still technically exist),52 such promise being enforceable in the same way as any other
valid unilateral promise. Alternatively, it is possible for a party, without undertaking
any obligation to the other party (whether by way of contract or promise), simply to
declare unilaterally that it is renouncing its rights in favour of another. This has the
48 Opponents have taken the view that his argument stretches the plain meaning of the text of
the BGB: see Volker Rieble, in J von Staudingers (ed), Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch
(rev edn Sellier, Munich 2005) ·397, fn 5.
49 For instance, Sir John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England (4th edn printed for A
Strachan, London, 1800), notes (127) the case of Lynn v Bruce 2 H Bl 317 (CP), in which a
declaration had been made by A that he had, at B’s request, agreed to accept from B a composition
of so much in the pound upon a certain sum of money owing by B in full satisfaction and
discharge of B’s debt. It was held that B’s promise to pay this composition was not a good
consideration to support an assumpsit against B, and that ‘upon an accord, which this is, no
remedy lies’ (per Lord Chief Justice Eyre).
50 See Ibbetson (n 9) 240, and cases cited there.
51 See Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605 (HL), and Re Selectmove [1995] 1 WLR 474 (CA).
52 The latter interpretation would not strictly qualify as a renunciation of rights, but merely as
an undertaking that the promisor was forbearing to exercise the rights either permanently or for
some period of time.
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effect of extinguishing the rights, but does not create any new obligation. Such
unilateral acts of renunciation are possible in respect of both contractual and non-
contractual rights.53
There seems no overriding reason why an act of renunciation of contractual rights
should not theoretically be classiﬁable by a legal system as a unilateral juridical act,
quite apart from any contractual classiﬁcation which may be warranted by the facts,
unless, like the Common law, a concern is professed that no one should be entitled to
acquire a contractual right for no consideration.54 The obvious characterization of the
nature of a renunciation is as a unilateral act (whether a unilateral promise to renounce,
or more simply a unilateral act having the immediate effect of extinguishing the
rights), given that the consent of the other party seems a superﬂuous requirement.55
Any concern that the party in whose favour the renunciation is conceived may not wish
to take the beneﬁt of the renunciation can be met by giving such a party a right of
rejection, rather than in insisting upon an acceptance. That is the approach taken by
both Scots as well as Italian law.56
F. Donation
Although not the approach of every legal system, it is possible to distinguish unilateral
promise or contract on the one hand, and donation on the other. A unilateral promise or
contract to transfer something gratuitously to another in the future is a juridical act
which binds the donor to such future donation, and as such can be distinguished from
the subsequent juridical act of transfer of the ownership of the property in fulﬁlment of
the promise or contractual undertaking to donate. It is possible to classify the juridical
act of transfer as unilateral in nature, though some legal systems choose to classify it in
contractual terms, insisting that the donor’s act of transfer of the thing is an offer which
the donee is deemed to accept through the voluntary receipt of the thing. This, as will
be seen, is the approach of German law, which consequently conceives of the transfer
component of donation, as well as any preceding contract, in contractual terms.
The BGB deals with donation at ··516–534, deﬁning it as a gratuitous disposition by
which A enriches B out of A’s assets, a deﬁnition which focuses on the objective effect
of the transaction rather than any motive of the giver (as in French law).57 The wording
precludes services from being the subject of donation, as well as cases where A is not
permanently deprived of his assets (as with gratuitous contracts of mandate, loans for
use, and deposit, which are dealt with elsewhere in the Code).58 There must be a
demonstrable loss to the donor and a demonstrable gain to the donee, though the gain to
53 For instance: the right of ownership over property may be renounced unilaterally, the effect
being that the property affected is held to be abandoned, ownership passing to the Crown; a right
to claim damages for a delict may be renounced by unilateral act.
54 A concern which looks contrived since the general recognition of third party rights in
contract by virtue of the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
55 In the Principles of European Contract Law, a renunciation is treated as a unilateral promise
of the type allowed for in art 2:107.
56 Codice Civile art 1236, which provides that the renunciation does not take effect if the
debtor states within a reasonable period of time that he does not wish to proﬁt from the renunci-
ation.
57 The BGB deﬁnition of donation is found in ·516(1).
58 For mandate see ·662 f, for loans for use see ·598, and for gratuitous deposits see ·690.
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the donee may ﬂow only indirectly from the donor, as occurs for instance if the donor
discharges a debt owed by the donee to a third party.
As in other systems, donation may occur without any prior obligation requiring
the donation (as, for instance, in the case of the unexpected or impromptu gift) or it
may be preceded by a contract of donation. The act of donation itself—the gratuitous
disposition—occurs either by actual concurrence of the will of the parties, or without
reference to the will of the donee (‘ohne den Willen des anderen’, as ·516(2) puts it) so
long as the donor makes the disposition together with a request that it be accepted
within a speciﬁed reasonable period of time, and the donation is not rejected within that
time (this has the effect that the donation is deemed to be accepted by the donee, thus
conﬁrming the donative disposition). In essence then, acceptance of the donation
(whether actual or implied) by the donee is always necessary. This insistence that the
transfer be accepted seems an unnecessary requirement: if the concern is that donees
do not become the unwilling or unwitting owners of assets which are forced on them, it
would seem perfectly possible (as is the case in Scotland) to give the donee a right to
reject the asset, rather than to require him positively to accept it.
An important restriction on donation in German law is that contracts of donation
require notarial recording of ‘the promise’ in order to be valid,59 though failure to meet
this requirement can be cured by rendering performance under the donation.60 This
reference to ‘promise’ is telling: as the provision is designed to provide protection for
the donor, it means that technically only the promisor’s declaration of donative intent
requires to be notarized, even if in practice, if both parties have in any event signed a
contract of donation, the declaration of both is likely to receive notarial recording.61 To
this extent then, there is provision in the BGB for a unilateral aspect to the donation,
but it is only in the notarial requirements of the transaction.
But what would be the status in German law of the genuine unilateral promise,
rather than contract, to make a donation? For example, what would be the position
were A to state to B that ‘I promise to give you E1,000 on the 1st of next month’, and
nothing else (speciﬁcally, no acceptance of the promise) were to happen for the pres-
ent? In such a case, there would seem as yet to be no contract of donation, and thus no
concluded obligation on the part of the donor. However, such a promise would be
capable of being treated as an offer, which in German law would, by default, remain
open for acceptance by the offeree (the intended donee) for a reasonable time (such
time would, one would assume, have to expire prior to the time speciﬁed for the
transfer).62 When an acceptance to this offer was forthcoming, a contract of donation
would come in to being, though as a donative promise to pay it would require to be in
writing and to be notarised.63 To non-German eyes, this seems a somewhat round-
about, and not entirely satisfactory way, of holding a donor to his clearly expressed
unilateral declaration of will. A more direct means of enforcing the unilateral under-
taking would surely reﬂect the reality of what is going on and show greater respect for
the will of the intending donor. However, such a more direct route is not possible under
59 ·518(1). 60 ·518(2).
61 If, however, notarisation of both parties’ declarations was required by another provisions, as
for instance with land contracts, then that requirement would have to be met.
62 As for the irrevocable nature of offers in German law, see ·145 BGB.
63 ··518(1), 780 BGB.
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the BGB given the lack of a general provision recognizing the validity of unilateral
promises.
Yet again, the requirement of mutual consideration creates problems for the treat-
ment of donation in English law. A promise to gift something will be unsupported by
consideration given the gratuitous nature of the gift, and therefore a bare promise to
make a donation in the future is invalid in English law. However, the English courts
have held that consideration may be constituted by even seemingly esoteric beneﬁts, so
long as they are given on condition of the promise to donate. Thus, A’s promise to
make B a gift of a sum of money if Bmarries is an enforceable promise if supported by
B’s reciprocal promise to marry, the promise of B being deemed good consideration for
A’s promise.64 Indeed, such a counter promise to marry has been found even where the
facts seemed on their face to disclose no more than a gift made in prospect of the
donee’s marriage.65 This allows certain promises, which in civilian systems would be
treated as donation, to be enforced in English law as bargains on account of esoteric
consideration. By way of exception to the general rule requiring consideration for a
contract, promises of donation may be validly made in a deed, that is, in writing
expressing the intention that it be treated as a deed, signed by the donor, witnessed, and
delivered to the donee.66 That is evidently a somewhat involved and cumbersome
requirement, only likely to be used for signiﬁcant donations, though it captures more
clearly the unilateral nature of the promise, given that the involvement of the donee is
not required in the process.
It is, of course, possible under English law simply to donate something without any
prior obligation having been incurred to effect such a donation. Such a unilateral act of
gratuitous transfer is not conceived of as being itself an obligation (as in the German
contractual view), but simply has the effect of transferring ownership from A to B.
Such an act would occur where, for instance, a birthday or wedding gift was given to
someone, or money was placed in a charity collecting box.
Scotland is perhaps the jurisdiction where it is easiest to promise to donate some-
thing. That is so not simply because it recognizes a separate obligation of unilateral
promise, so that someone may either contract to make a donation or unilaterally
promise to do so, but also because certain types of unilateral promise may be made
without any formality at all. That is the case for promises undertaken ‘in the course of
business’. While it might seem less likely that donations will occur in a business
context, one can think of examples. For instance, a whisky manufacturer might
promise to the organizers of a charity rafﬂe to donate a bottle of whisky to the rafﬂe, or
a company might, without any prompting, promise to a sister company that it will
donate to the latter certain ofﬁce furniture which it no longer requires. These under-
takings, most naturally viewed as unilateral promises of donation given their unilateral
and gratuitous nature, would be enforced in Scots law as such; they would not be in
England or Germany. As in English law, the transfer of the property itself, rather than
any preceding contract or promise to donate, is viewed as a unilateral juridical act,
though the donee has the right of rejection of the property.
64 A position established early on, in Joscelin v Shelton (1557) 3 Leon 4 (KB), the earliest
English judgment in which there is a reference to the concept of consideration.
65 Shadwell v Shadwell [1860] 9 CBNS 159, 142 ER, 3 LT 628 (CP).
66 The requirements for a valid deed are found in the Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989, s 1.
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It will be appreciated from the above discussion that the three systems take different
approaches to donation. Scotland reserves a contractual analysis for any obligation to
effect the donation, while German law applies such a contractual analysis to the
transfer also. English law requires some nominal consideration for a contract of do-
nation, the other two systems do not. Only in Scotland can someone unilaterally
promise to make a donation: German law would manage to give effect to such a
promise only if the offeree accepted the (usually irrevocable) offer within a reasonable
time, but English law would not give legal effect to such a bare promise at all. All three
systems conceive of donation as occurring only with the consent of the donee, though
in Scotland this is by virtue of giving the donee a right to reject the donation, rather
than by requiring an acceptance, either express or implied, by the donee. As for the
DCFR, though its primary conception of donation is as a contract,67 it also provides
that a donation may validly occur by way of unilateral undertaking,68 an approach
which mirrors the alternatives available in Scotland.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The simple conclusion to be drawn from the above study is that legal systems must stop
forcing unilateral promises into contractual models, as doing so distorts the reality of
those unilateral undertakings. The law no longer calls unjustiﬁed enrichment ‘quasi
contract’; similarly, it ought to stop treating unilateral promise as ‘quasi contract’ by
forcing promise to wear contract’s borrowed clothing. We ought to recognize, as the
Natural lawyers and Scholastics did in centuries past, that unilateral promises merit
being enforced in their own right as much as contracts.
Although it might seem that, for the Common Law, an acceptance of this view
would require a fundamental realignment of the law of obligations, including dis-
carding the doctrine of consideration as the sole method of demonstrating seriousness
of intent, such a realignment is more radical in theory and appearance than it would be
in practice. It has been seen that English law already enforces unilateral promises in
many of the cases where German law and Scots law do so too, recognising that the
imperative of justice mandates the adoption of some solution. Though the solution
often has to be dressed up as contractual in nature, the totality of these instances of
unilateral liability, taken together with an ever greater willingness of the courts to
discover consideration, suggest that it would not be such a dramatic change for English
law to move from its current position that unilateral obligations are not enforceable
(subject to some exclusions) to the directly opposite view.
For German Law, acceptance of the approach promoted here would entail using the
already recognized but limited cases of unilateral obligation, such as the public offer of
reward, as the basis upon which to build a more generally recognized category of
unilateral obligation, as von Ku¨bel had originally hoped would be the case. Doubtless
this would involve changes to the text of the BGB, but such changes would surely be
consistent with the idea of the freedom of the will which is encapsulated in ·311(1)
BGB, as well as the concept of a unilateral juridical act which already exists in the
Code.
67 Book IV.H. 68 IV.H.-1:104.
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That the suggestion of explicitly and generally enforcing unilateral promises has
merit seems to be supported by the fact that under both the PECL and the DCFR
unilateral promises are to be enforced where the promisor intended to undertake
liability. The PECL provide that a ‘promise which is intended to be legally binding
without acceptance is binding’,69 and state that the Principles are to apply with ‘ap-
propriate modiﬁcation’ (whatever that means) to such promises.70 Similarly, the DCFR
speciﬁcally provides, alongside the provision that a contract binds the parties,71 that a
‘valid unilateral undertaking is binding on the person giving it if it is intended to be
legally binding without acceptance’.72 These model law provisions provide a clear
base from which to argue that the types of scenario discussed above could be seen as
instances of unilateral promise, though the constraints of space prevent the pursuit of a
deeper analysis of the potential of the PECL and DCFR in this respect.
We must restore to promise the central role which it once had in the private law of
the ius commune. It had such a central role because it was rightly recognized that
making promises is as much a fundamental aspect of human interaction as the bar-
gained for contract. To dress promises up as contracts, and in so doing to fail to
recognize unilateral promise-making for what it is, is juridically dishonest and leads to
the placing of forced and inappropriate constructions on many transactions. A promise
was once described as ‘that which is simple and pure’.73 We should seek in the new
European ius commune simple and pure legal solutions to give effect to those unilateral
promises which are seriously intended to have legal effect.
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73 J Dalrymple (Viscount Stair), The Institutions of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh and
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